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Abstract
Certain states impose restrictions on assisted reproduction because they believe such acts to be morally 
wrong. However, people who live in a state with restrictive legislation always have the option of going 
abroad to evade that law. Turkey and several states in Australia have enacted extraterritorial laws to stop 
forms of reproductive travelling for law evasion. Within the EU, the European Convention of Human 
Rights would normally remove the need for extraterritorial laws. However, because of the wide margin of 
appreciation allowed by the European Court of Human Rights, legal diversity on these matters persists. 
In the case of S.H. and Others v. Austria, moral justiﬁcation, consistency and proportionality were intro-
duced by the First Section to rule on Member States’ legislation on medically assisted reproduction. The 
First Section mostly ruled on the eﬀectiveness of the law, while the focus should be on the validity of the 
normative aim. The Grand Chamber reversed this judgement based on the margin of appreciation doc-
trine, using it as a pragmatic substitute for a substantial decision. In general, the EU’s interests of harmo-
nization and uniﬁcation are at odds with the right to national identity of individual states in areas of 
contested morality.
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1. Introduction
Cross-border reproductive care (CBRC) is a growing phenomenon where infer-
tile patients cross borders in order to obtain reproductive treatment abroad. In a 
recent survey it was estimated that within Europe at least 24000-30000 cycles are 
performed annually on at least 11000-14000 foreign patients.1 The diﬀerent 
causes of CBRC can be divided into two groups: legal restrictions and/or avail-
ability issues in the state of aﬃliation.2 This is not surprising, since patients are 
less likely to travel if the treatment they need is readily available at home. The 
1) F. Shenﬁeld, J. de Mouzon, G. Pennings, A.P. Ferraretti, A. Nyboe Andersen, G. de Wert and V. Goos-
sens, “Cross-border reproductive care in six European countries”, Human Reproduction 25(6) (2010) 
1361-1368.
2) G. Pennings, G. de Wert, F. Shenﬁeld, J. Cohen, B. Tarlatzis and P. Devroey, “ESHRE Task Force on 
Ethics and Law 15: Cross-Border Reproductive Care”, Human Reproduction 23(10) (2008) 2182-2184.
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survey showed that most patients (54.8%) travelled for legal reasons.3 We will 
focus on those patients who cross borders to circumvent the law in their state of 
aﬃliation because they pose some interesting legal and moral questions.
In an earlier article, we approached the issue of CBRC for law evasion from the 
perspective of the individual and the state.4 In this text, we consider the issue 
from a European perspective: How can the EU balance diﬀerent national identi-
ties in morally sensitive areas on the one hand and free movement laws on the 
other? How can a Member State that imposes restrictions on certain forms of 
assisted reproduction protect its moral position when its citizens can travel freely 
to other Member States for the treatment?
2. Legal Diversity
The issue with legal diversity is that some countries prohibit some forms of med-
ically assisted reproduction (e.g., oocyte donation) or deny access to some groups 
of people (e.g., same sex couples) while other countries permit the same actions. 
The lack of consensus is also striking among the EU Member States. If one were 
to take a biopsy of the legal situation in one country in Europe, one would know 
nothing about the legal situation in the neighbouring countries or about Euro-
pean legislation as a whole.5 The laws on gamete donation perfectly illustrate legal 
diversity within Europe. Italy, Lithuania and Turkey prohibit gamete donation 
completely. All other states allow sperm donation and sperm donors are usually 
given a small compensation (approximately 50-100 Euros). Austria, Croatia, 
Germany, Norway and Switzerland ban egg donation. The Czech Republic and 
Spain allow egg donation and payments to egg donors of 800 and 900 Euros, 
respectively. In several states, including Cyprus and Romania, the matter is not 
regulated, but gamete donation is used in practice. On the matter of identiﬁabil-
ity of the donor, the whole spectrum of possibilities is present, ranging from 
compulsory anonymity (e.g., France, Spain and Norway) over double track sys-
tems (e.g., Iceland) to complete identiﬁability (e.g., The Netherlands, the UK and 
Sweden).
Legal diversity is a necessary condition for the worldwide phenomenon where 
patients are travelling abroad to wherever the treatment they are looking for is 
provided. Within the EU patients may even be entitled to reimbursement for 
(part of ) such treatment in some cases. For example, when a Dutch couple goes 
to Belgium to use an anonymous sperm donor because the Dutch law only allows 
3) Supra note 1.
4) W. Van Hoof and G. Pennings, “Extraterritoriality for cross-border reproductive care: should states 
act against citizens travelling abroad for illegal infertility treatment?”, Reproductive Biomedicine Online 
23 (2011) 546-554.
5) G. Pennings, “International evolution of legislation and guidelines in medically assisted reproduction”, 
Reproductive Biomedicine Online 18 supplement 2 (2009) 15-18.
 W. Van Hoof, G. Pennings / European Journal of Health Law 19 (2012) 187-200 189
identiﬁable donation, the treatment will be reimbursed as if it had taken place in 
the Netherlands.
Several patterns have developed over the years directly aﬀected by legal devel-
opments. For instance, in France, only heterosexual couples have access to fertil-
ity treatments, so many French lesbians travel to Belgium to be inseminated with 
donor sperm.6 After the restrictive Italian law was enacted in 2004, ‘reproductive 
emigration’ quadrupled (from 1066 in 2003, to 4173 in 2005).7 The permissive 
policies on egg donation in Spain and the Czech Republic have made them pop-
ular destinations for couples that require donor eggs. Many Italians go to Spain 
and many Germans to the Czech Republic to evade restrictions on egg donation 
in their home state.8
3. Extraterritorial Laws
3.1. Extraterritorial Laws in Areas of Legal Diversity
People who live in a state with restrictive legislation always have the option of 
going abroad to evade that law. However, the reason why certain states impose 
restrictions on medically assisted reproduction is because they believe such acts to 
be morally wrong. The act of crossing a border does not change the morality of 
an act fundamentally: if an act is wrong, it is wrong wherever it takes place. From 
an ethical point of view, extraterritoriality would be the rule.
In the past, states rarely reacted to their citizens going abroad for fertility treat-
ment that is illegal at home. Maybe such movements went unnoticed, maybe they 
were tolerated or maybe they believed that they simply could not do anything to 
stop them. Recently, however, Turkey and several states in Australia have enacted 
extraterritorial laws that are directly aimed at putting an end to reproductive 
travelling.
Turkey has justiﬁed strict prohibitions on gamete donation and surrogacy, 
including treatments abroad by referring to item 231 of the Turkish Penal Code, 
according to which it is illegal to “change or obscure a child’s ancestry”. If it is 
discovered that an individual has travelled abroad to receive fertility treatment 
using donor eggs, donor sperm or surrogacy, then the person who has conducted 
this procedure, the persons who have referred patients or acted as intermediaries, 
6) G. Pennings, “Cross-border reproductive care in Belgium”, Human Reproduction 24(12) (2009) 
3108-3118.
7) A.P. Ferraretti, G. Pennings, L. Gianaroli, F. Natali and M.C. Magli, “Cross-border reproductive care: a 
phenomenon expressing the controversial aspects of reproductive technologies”, Reproductive Biomedicine 
Online 20 (2010), 261-266.
8) Supra note 1.
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the impregnated person, and the donor will be reported to the state prosecutor.9 
They are all potentially subject to punishment of one to three years imprison-
ment. The recent ‘Surrogacy Bill 2010’ in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, 
includes punishments for those who enter into commercial arrangements of up to 
two years in jail, a ﬁne of $110,000 or both. The law was given an extraterritorial 
scope to cement the government’s position on commercial surrogacy in the best 
interest of the child, to close a loophole in the proposed bill and to prevent exploi-
tation of vulnerable women.10
These laws grant the state power of prosecution based on the nationality of the 
actor. The nationality principle oﬀers a powerful legal tool to impose a universal 
duty to obey the law. However, there are serious philosophical issues with this 
principle: the ground for a state’s right to punish is territorial in nature and it is 
in the best interest of both residents and non-residents on a territory to be under 
local legal protection.11 In areas of contested morality, there are judicial issues 
with extraterritoriality regarding choice of law and the question of double crimi-
nality.12 Double criminality means that people can only be punished for extrater-
ritorial actions that are considered a crime in both countries. In areas of legal 
diversity, double criminality renders extraterritorial laws meaningless. Even when 
it seems that there is a widespread legal consensus, as is the case for sex with chil-
dren, double criminality may prove to be an impediment, as ages of consent may 
still diﬀer across cultures.13 If states accept no exceptions to the age of consent for 
cultural or other reasons, double criminality components must be removed from 
sex tourism legislation. Without double criminality extraterritorial laws imply 
moral radicalism, which is only justiﬁed for acts that are clearly harmful or wrong. 
In legal terms, this means that extraterritoriality is only justiﬁed when there is a 
human rights violation.
3.2. The Moral Grounds for Extraterritoriality
There are three instances of extraterritorial laws based on the nationality principle 
in domains that share characteristics with certain applications of medically assisted 
reproduction: abortion, sex with children and female genital cutting (FGC). 
These domains pertain to respect for the embryo and foetus, rights of the child 
and women’s rights. Analogical reasoning based on the formal principle of justice 
 9) Z.B. Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel: Turkey’s ART legislation and third-party assisted repro-
duction”, Reproductive Biomedicine Online 23 (2011) 555-564.
10) NSW Parliament, 11/11/2010. “Surrogacy Bill 2010.” Retrieved 26 August 2011, www.parliament.
nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LC20101111047.
11) A. Chehtman, “The Extraterritorial Scope of the Right to Punish”, Law and Philosophy 29 (2010) 
127-157.
12) J.W. Dellapenna, “Abortion across state lines”, Brigham Young University Law Review (2008) 
1651-1702.
13) A. Fraley, “Child Sex Tourism Legislation under the Protect Act: Does It Really Protect?”, St. Johns 
Law Review 79 (2005) 445-484.
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(similar cases must be treated similarly and diﬀerent cases diﬀerently) will bring 
forward the moral grounds for extraterritorial laws in general and in the case of 
assisted reproduction.14 These analogies will clarify what constitutes a reasonable 
and objective justiﬁcation to recognize an act as a ‘clear moral wrong’.
There are two general lines of reasoning to justify an act or decision: utilitarian 
arguments that refer to the eﬀects on the welfare of the persons involved and 
deontological arguments that refer to moral rules, moral principles and rights and 
duties. These arguments partly overlap: interests of people are protected by rights, 
but in some cases a person’s rights can be violated even if the person is better oﬀ 
(or at least not worse oﬀ) after the violation. In the case of sex with children, a 
review of the available empirical evidence showed that this does not harm them 
signiﬁcantly over time, especially if the sexual experience was nonviolent and 
consensual.15 However, a strict ban on sex with children is still justiﬁed based on 
the right of a child to sexual autonomy and bodily integrity.
In the case of FGC, there is a lot of international lobbying, most notably from 
the WHO, to universally condemn the practice. This resulted in an extensive 
legal consensus. Several European countries reacted to this international pressure 
by implementing speciﬁc legislation (e.g., Austria in 2002, Belgium in 2001, 
Denmark in 2003, Italy in 2005, Spain in 2003, Sweden in 1982, the UK in 
2004), or by making general law provisions applicable to FGC.16 Deontological 
arguments for this condemnation are based on several rights, including the pro-
tection of bodily integrity and protection against discrimination.17 Utilitarian 
arguments are straightforward: mutilating a woman’s genitals is clearly harmful. 
Because the extensive forms of FGC constitute an indisputable moral wrong, 
extraterritorial laws without double criminality can be justiﬁed. However, even 
though the WHO identiﬁes four diﬀerent types of FGC, they all fall under the 
general condemnation. There are forms of symbolic cutting in a medical setting 
that are not signiﬁcantly harmful.18 For these minimal invasive forms of cutting, 
the right to cultural identity and expression can be asserted.
It is not always easy to discern what a ‘clear moral wrong’ is. For abortion, a 
very strong consistent case can be made to justify a restrictive policy. If one attri-
butes a high moral status to the embryo and foetus, abortion constitutes some 
kind of murder. It would be inconsistent with such conviction to allow citizens to 
14) Supra note 4.
15) B. Rind, P. Tromovitch and R. Bauserman, “A meta-analytic examination of assumed properties of 
child sexual abuse using college samples”, Psychological Bulletin 124(1) (1998) 22-53.
16) E. Leye, J. Deblonde, J. García-Añón, S. Johnsdotter, A. Kwateng-Kluvitse, L. Weil-Curiel and 
M. Temmerman, “An analysis of the implementation of laws with regard to female genital mutilation in 
Europe”, Crime Law Sociological Change 47 (2007) 1-31.
17) WHO, 2008, “Eliminating female genital mutilation: an interagency statement.” Retrieved 26 August 
2011, http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/fgm/9789241596442/en/index.html.
18) A.E. Galeotti, “Relativism, universalism, and applied ethics: the case of female circumcision”, Constel-
lations 14 (2007) 91-111.
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terminate their pregnancies abroad. Take the Irish abortion policy for example. In 
Ireland, any abortion is illegal unless the pregnancy endangers the life of the 
woman. This is a consistent policy: if the embryo or foetus is a human life, only 
another human life can outbalance its right to life. In the landmark case of Attor-
ney General v. X, the Republic of Ireland did try to deny a 14 year old rape victim 
the right to travel because she was going to terminate her pregnancy. A series of 
judgements by the European Courts subsequently conﬁrmed that restricting 
travel is a direct violation of the European Community treaty, which guarantees 
free movement of persons and services. For a short while during the early 90s, 
gynaecological examinations were forced on some women returning from the 
Netherlands at the German border. These women were criminally prosecuted if 
they had had an abortion. However, this practice was condemned by the Euro-
pean Parliament on the grounds that “the internal borders of the [European] 
Community may not be used to threaten citizens with prosecution for activities 
that are perfectly legal in some Member States but not in others”.19 Because of 
legal diversity and EU laws on free movement, the Irish government has to allow 
its citizens to go abroad to commit ‘murder’. The UK Department of Health 
publishes annual numbers estimating that between January 1980 and December 
2010, at least 146,442 women travelled from the Republic of Ireland for abortion 
services in the UK.20
The central question in all this is what the diﬀerence is between sex with chil-
dren and extensive FGC on the one hand, and abortion on the other hand. In 
both cases, the act in question is considered a clear moral wrong in an individual 
Member State. There is no reaction from the EU to extraterritorial laws that pro-
hibit travelling for sex with children or FGC. For abortion, however, European 
law dictates that states should grant their nationals the right to travel. It is not 
the individual Member State’s appreciation of the seriousness of the act that 
determines whether or not extraterritoriality is warranted. When Europe agrees 
with the prohibition, exterritorial laws are accepted; if Europe disagrees, they are 
forbidden.
3.3. The Morality of Extraterritorial Laws for CBRC
Most treatments for which people cross borders in the case of CBRC for law eva-
sion are not necessarily morally wrong. The only treatment that is universally 
recognized as harmful or wrong at the moment is reproductive cloning. For all 
other treatments the harm or the fundamental right that forms the ground for 
19) Resolution on Compulsory Gynaecological Examinations at the Dutch-German Border of March 14, 
1991, 1991 OJ. (C 106) 113.
20) IFPA. 2011. “Between January 1980 and December 2010, at least 147,912 women travelled from 
the Republic of Ireland for safe abortion services abroad.” Retrieved 26 August 2011 http://www.ifpa.ie/
Hot-Topics/Abortion/Statistics.
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legislation is avoidable or disputable, so the application of the nationality prin-
ciple would be too radical.21 There is a lack of justiﬁcation for the Turkish and 
NSW extraterritorial laws because gamete donation and commercial surrogacy 
are not indisputable moral wrongs.
In the case of commercial surrogacy, restrictive legislation may result in a fac-
tual extraterritorial ban, as a side eﬀect of national laws. There have been court 
cases in several states including Belgium, France, Germany and the UK because 
the commissioning couple could not bring their oﬀspring home after an interna-
tional commercial surrogacy arrangement. The surrogacy contract that recognizes 
the commissioning couple as legal parents is not recognized in states that prohibit 
commercial surrogacy or have no legislation on the matter. In this situation, the 
state of treatment (e.g., India, Ukraine, US) recognizes the commissioning couple 
as legal parents and the couple’s home state considers the birth mother, i.e. the 
surrogate as legal parent. As a consequence, the children are stuck abroad, in 
between two legal systems, waiting for a court decision that calls for an exception 
to the law ‘in the best interest of the child’.22
If extraterritoriality for commercial surrogacy is unjustiﬁed, should states not 
address such issues of comity as well? Until now, these court decisions are not 
recognized as precedents, which means that similar cases will continue to emerge. 
If they would become precedents, foreign commercial surrogacy contracts would 
become valid in restrictive states. In practice, this would mean that states should 
actively make possible behaviour of their citizens that they consider immoral. In 
a way, this is what current EU legislation and case law demand of Member States 
with regard to treatments that are legal in some states but not in others, such as 
abortion, anonymous or identiﬁable gamete donation, preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis and the like.
4. Consistencies and Inconsistencies at EU Level
4.1. Tensions in EU Legislation
Health policy in the EU has a fundamental tension at its core. On the one hand, 
article 168(7) of the EC Treaty states explicitly that public health is the responsi-
bility of the Member States. On the other hand, many aspects of national health 
care systems are subject to EU law and policy because health care involves people 
(e.g., medical staﬀ and patients), goods (e.g., drugs and devices) and services 
(health care funders and providers), all of which are granted freedom of movement 
across borders. The eﬀect of EU laws on health care form a kind of patchwork, 
21) Supra note 4.
22) E.g. A.J. et F.V. 22/03/2010, tribunal of Huy, Journal des Tribunaux 2010, 420.
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unconnected by legal or policy coherence.23 The recent directive on the applica-
tion of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (2011/24/EU) is one small step 
in the direction of legal harmonization on the basics of cross-border healthcare, 
but it does not alleviate the tension of legal diversity on ethically controversial 
treatments. A Member State cannot prevent its citizens from going abroad to get 
fertility treatment that it considers illegal and immoral. The discussions on the 
European directive on patient mobility show that there were some real concerns 
that the rights given to the patients to obtain treatment abroad would imply 
that Member States would be obliged to pay for illegal treatment. Therefore, an 
amendment was introduced to make it clear that the directive does not imply that 
Member States would have to reimburse “ethically controversial medical ‘services’ 
like euthanasia, DNA-testing or IVF” when the relevant service is not allowed, 
or at least not ﬁnanced, in the relevant Member States.24 The Member States 
wanted to keep their autonomy to decide which treatments are ethically accept-
able. The directive ensures that Member States can still decide which treatments 
to reimburse and explicitly states that “no provision of this Directive should be 
interpreted in such a way as to undermine the fundamental ethical choices of 
Member States.”25
The argument can also be approached the other way around: it is in principle 
possible that EU citizens claim before the ECJ that the Irish abortion ban restrains 
them from making use of their free movement rights.26 This would only be pos-
sible if the ECtHR judgement in Tysiąc v. Poland implies that EU law guarantees 
a right to therapeutic abortion.27 Otherwise the Irish government could argue 
that they do not deter people from travelling for an abortion.
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is the alfa and omega to 
evaluate legislation in areas of contested morality in Member States. The ECtHR 
developed the concept of ‘margin of appreciation’ to take into account that the 
principles of the Convention are broadly-drawn and to anticipate variable inter-
pretations in diﬀerent societies. In principle, this doctrine limits the tension 
between the EU’s twofold objective to respect national identities of the Member 
States in moral issues and to maximize free movement without restrictions. No 
23) T. Hervey and B. Vanhercke, “Health care and the EU: the law and policy patchwork”, in: E. Mossialos, 
G. Permanand, R. Baeten and T. Hervey (eds.) Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European 
Union Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp. 84-133.
24) European Parliament, 2009. Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (COM(2008)0414 — 
C6-0257/2008 – 2008/0142(COD)) Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.
25) Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the appli-
cation of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, recitals 33 and 7.
26) N. Koﬀeman, “The impact of EU fundamental freedoms on diverging human rights standards; a need 
for (European) regulation?” Paper for the Dubrovnik seminar on Market Freedoms and Fundamental 
Rights in the Enlarging European Union (2010).
27) N. Priaulx, “Testing the Margin of Appreciation: Therapeutic Abortion, Reproductive ‘Rights’ and the 
Intriguing Case of Tysiąc v. Poland”, European Journal of Health Law 15 (2008) 361-379.
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state should try to prevent its citizens from going abroad to circumvent the law 
because all states adhere to a certain appreciation of the ECHR. However, for 
some of the most sensitive issues within the EU, like abortion and assisted repro-
duction, the ECtHR holds that ‘the margin of appreciation aﬀorded to the 
respondent state must be a wide one’.28 In practice, this means that the ECtHR 
names both restrictive policies (Lithuania, Italy and Turkey) and permissive poli-
cies on gamete donation as valid appreciations.29 It means that the court has 
limited powers when some states deny rights, such as the right to abortion, that 
almost all other Member States consider valid.30 From the point of view of the 
restrictive state, this means that they are forced to allow their citizens to go abroad 
to commit immoral acts. The margin of appreciation does not solve issues of legal 
diversity in areas of contested morality when it is very wide.
4.2. The Demand for Consistency and Justiﬁcation in the First Section Judgement of 
S.H. and Others v. Austria
The margin of appreciation doctrine results in a conﬁrmation of legal diversity. In 
areas of contested morality, a diﬀerent concept is used to rule on legislation: pro-
portionality. Proportionality requires that restrictive policies are rationally related 
to their ﬁnal aim. Because human reproduction is so fundamental to human 
experience and because medically assisted reproduction is subject to diametrically 
opposed moral reactions, the standard is raised to a heightened level of rationality 
or proportionality.31 Because of the private nature of procreative choice and the 
fundamental rights at stake, “the least intrusive means of achieving the aim pur-
sued” are preferable.32 In short, states should enact the least intrusive legislation 
that expresses a legitimate moral position conform the national identity and 
beliefs.
The concept of proportionality amounts to another means for the ECtHR to 
limit the interpretations of the ECHR besides the margin of appreciation. It 
serves to prevent restrictions that have little to do with the achievement of the 
normative goal. In S.H. and Others v. Austria, the 1992 Artiﬁcial Procreation Act, 
which prohibits egg donation entirely and sperm donation for the purpose of 
IVF, was deemed disproportionate by the First Section. Austria’s justiﬁcation for 
this policy was that use of third party gametes could lead to ‘selection’ of children, 
that there is a risk of exploitation and humiliation of egg donors, that allowing 
gamete donation would lead to unusual (/unnatural) relationships and that 
28) European Commission of Human Rights Hercz v. Norway appl. No. 17004/90, 1992; ECtHR Grand 
Chamber S.H. and Others v. Austria appl. No. 57813/00, 2011.
29) ECtHR S.H. and Others v. Austria appl. No. 57813/00, 2010-2011.
30) ECtHR A.B. and C. v. Ireland appl. No. 25579/05, 2010.
31) R. Storrow, “The pluralism problem in cross-border reproductive care”, Human Reproduction 25(12) 
(2010) 2939-2943.
32) ECtHR First Section S.H. and Others v. Austria appl. No. 57813/00, 2010.
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children have a right to be informed about their genetic origins. The German 
government, which enacted very similar legislation, also submitted to the court 
that allowing egg donation would split motherhood in two, which ‘would be an 
absolute novelty in nature and in the history of mankind’. It would interfere with 
the basic principle mater semper certa est.
The ﬁrst and second applicants in S.H. and Others v. Austria could only con-
ceive a child by making use of donor sperm and IVF, while the third and fourth 
applicants needed egg donation. They argued that their right to respect for private 
and family life (ECHR Article 8) was violated and that the incoherence in allow-
ing some techniques but not others amounted to unjustiﬁed discrimination 
(ECHR Article 14). The First Section held that the Austrian government pro-
vided insuﬃcient justiﬁcation to treat people who need to fulﬁl their wish for a 
child using gamete donation diﬀerently. Social acceptability is not a suﬃcient 
reason for a complete ban of a speciﬁc procreation technique. Moreover, unusual 
family relationships are nothing new in modern families. As far as the risk of 
exploitation of egg donors is concerned, potential abuse is not a suﬃcient reason 
to restrict if there exists the possibility to regulate and devise safeguards against 
abuse. Ultimately the First Section stated that most of the arguments of the Aus-
trian government were aimed against gamete donation in general, like the argu-
ments of eugenics and the right of the child to know its genetic origins, while 
sperm donation for in vivo fertilization is allowed.
Thus the First Section found that the prohibition at issue lacked a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realized.33 Although the court suggested throughout its opinion that Austria 
was entitled to a wide margin of appreciation in regulating assisted reproduction, 
its decision to oblige Austria to elect the least intrusive means and justify them 
with ‘particularly persuasive’ arguments signals its establishment of proportional-
ity as the most appropriate standard for legislating in this context.34
4.3. Consistent and Justiﬁed Policy Making in Areas of Contested Morality
The focus on the standard of proportionality within a wide margin of apprecia-
tion amounts to an examination of the means-end rationality without interfering 
with the choice of ends. After the First Section judgement in S.H. and Others, the 
Austrian government could just as well abolish all gamete donation, as is the case 
in Italy, Lithuania and Turkey. In that case, the law would be consistent: it would 
be rationally related to the aim of preventing exploitation of donors and selection 
of children.
33) ECtHR First Section S.H. and Others v. Austria appl. No. 57813/00, 2010.
34) Supra note 28.
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The issue at stake here is whether it is preferable to demand that legislation on 
complex moral issues is consistent. The original demand for consistent policy 
making in S.H. and Others v. Austria could have had many unforeseen conse-
quences. Intuitively, one would expect any policy to be consistent, especially one 
that is explicitly based on moral grounds. However, in the case of policies on 
medically assisted reproduction, the lawmakers want to ensure the welfare of the 
future child, cost-eﬀectiveness, safety and equity in access, prevent exploitation of 
donors and surrogates and devise safeguards against abuse. Balancing these crite-
ria may lead to complex compromises. Moreover, these complex compromises 
should ﬁt in an entire legal system. Some laws may end up contradicting each 
other or some unforeseen loopholes may appear after enactment. Furthermore, 
medically assisted reproduction is rapidly evolving, both technically speaking and 
in public opinion, and it touches on sensitive private matters. A demand for some 
consistency may be a valid concern from a European perspective, but national 
legislation should be suited for the complexity of medically assisted reproduction 
in all its aspects.
For future reference, the First Section decision from the ECtHR eﬀectively 
made nuanced policy making impossible based on the proportionality principle. 
Moreover, by focussing on the consistency of the law, the court has granted itself 
the power to question the eﬀectiveness of legislation with only minor regard for 
the normative aim. However, people go to the court because they want to 
denounce a certain appreciation of the ECHR. Some moral intuitions that are 
deeply entrenched in some national legislation would not survive ethical scrutiny. 
The court should reprimand states for enacting legislation that is conform a 
national consensus, entrenched in national culture, identity and/or religion, but 
ethically ﬂawed or inconsistent. On the other hand, how would that reﬂect on the 
EU’s objective to respect national identities in private matters?
Take the French (and many other states’) ban on assisted reproduction for 
same sex couples for example. A deontological justiﬁcation for this policy would 
be based on the moral superiority of the traditional nuclear family. A child has a 
right to a mother and a father. However, given previous judgements of the 
ECtHR, a couple has a right to conceive a child and to make use of medically 
assisted reproduction to that end under Article 8 of the ECHR.35 Moreover, any 
diﬀerence in treatment should have objective and reasonable justiﬁcation as 
required by article 14 of the ECHR. In S.H. and Others v. Austria, the court 
already refused to accept reasons of social acceptability such as unusual relation-
ships (e.g., same sex parents) as a deontological argument. The French govern-
ment would then have to produce other objective and reasonable grounds to 
restrict access to same sex couples. However, there is no ground for such a policy 
35) E.g. ECtHR Dickson v. the United Kingdom appl. no. 44362/04, 2007.
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beyond the dogmatic and morally ﬂawed position that it is unnatural for same sex 
couples to have children.36 The utilitarian argument that a child would not be 
reasonably well oﬀ with same sex parents has been disproved by recent research 
and more and more everyday examples.
4.4. The Power of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine
The Grand Chamber reversed the judgement of the First Section based on the 
margin of appreciation: at the relevant time, the Austrian legislature did not 
exceed the margin aﬀorded to it.37 The court observed that the Austrian parlia-
ment has not suﬃciently reacted to the dynamic developments in science and 
society since the enactment of the law in 1992. However, the government had 
several legitimate aims to interfere with the right to private and family life. 
Whether these aims were necessary in democratic societies or whether any alter-
native legislation would be more justiﬁed, is not up to the court to decide. State 
authorities are better equipped to answer this question. The court merely decides 
whether the prohibitions were justiﬁed at the time they were considered by the 
Austrian Constitutional Court. Because there is a wide margin of appreciation, 
the court judges this to be the case. Hence, the court develops a very minimalistic 
approach to review national legislation on medically assisted reproduction.
We supported the judgement of the First Section, but we disagreed with its 
reasoning. We disagree with the judgement of the Grand Chamber and we ﬁnd 
the arguments to be weak. The Grand Chamber is correct in identifying Austria’s 
normative aims as legitimate: who would not want to ensure the welfare of chil-
dren, protect donors and prevent selective reproduction? However, a law that 
prohibits egg donation and sperm donation for the purpose of IVF has mainly 
diﬀerent aims. Moreover, rather than to take these normative aims seriously, the 
current prohibition entails that the legislature gives up on the practice entirely. 
Such a law interferes with the basic right to private and family life. If an alterna-
tive is morally superior, there is something wrong with the current law. The First 
Section already found that alternatives and safeguards were readily available for all 
Austria’s ‘legitimate aims’. The Grand Chamber pays particular attention to the 
argument that egg donation interferes with the wish to maintain the basic prin-
ciple of civil law — mater semper certa est.38 To add to the counterargument in the 
First Section judgement (i.e., there is nothing new about unusual relationships in 
modern families), Austrians still have the right to travel for egg donation, which 
means that the basic principle is already no longer maintained.
36) G. Pennings, “Evaluating the welfare of the child in same-sex families”, Human Reproduction 26(7) 
(2011) 1609-1615.
37) ECtHR Grand Chamber S.H. and Others v. Austria appl. No. 57813/00, 2011.
38) Ibid.
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The court allows a wide margin of appreciation because legislation on medi-
cally assisted reproduction is a matter of morality. An a fortiori argument advanced 
by the Grand Chamber for allowing the wide margin is that there is no European 
consensus. However, consensus has no moral value: people can agree on immoral 
views. These views should be subject to ethical scrutiny, but the court treats them 
as the product of it. The court also states that people always have the option of 
going abroad. This can be seen as a pragmatic reason for a wide margin of appre-
ciation. However, as the dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova 
Trajkovska and Tsotsoria also states: this argument does not address the real ques-
tion, that of interference with the applicants’ private life as a result of the absolute 
prohibition in Austria.39 The judgement of the Grand Chamber is falls short 
because it uses the margin of appreciation as a pragmatic substitute for a well 
thought-out approach to the problem of proper scope of review in areas of con-
tested morality.
5. Conclusion
Legal diversity in legislation on medically assisted reproduction and growing 
ﬂows of patients crossing borders to evade restrictive laws constitute a threat to 
the protection of national identities within the EU. The individual state could 
end CBRC for law evasion by enacting extraterritorial legislation. This is only 
justiﬁed if there is an indisputable moral wrong. What constitutes such a wrong 
can only be deﬁned in legal terms by referring to human rights. EU laws and 
courts, speciﬁcally the ECHR and ECtHR should remove the need for extrater-
ritorial protection of moral interests. In areas of contested morality the ECHR is 
interpreted by diﬀerent Member States in diametrically opposed ways, which 
indicates the need for some form of third party oversight. However, as the ECtHR 
allows a wide margin of appreciation in matters of private life, such oversight is 
limited to demands for proportionality, consistency and proper justiﬁcation. In 
S.H. and Others v. Austria, the First Section focussed mainly on the means-end 
rationality behind the law and little on the moral end. The Grand Chamber used 
the margin of appreciation to formulate a minimalistic approach to review 
national legislation. In the future, the court should live up to its role as third party 
overseer on respect for human rights in Europe. To that end, the court should 
focus on the normative aim of laws on medically assisted reproduction and nar-
row the margin of appreciation in this matter of private life when there is arbi-
trary interference with the basic right to family life.
The core tension at EU level in the case of CBRC for law evasion is the con-
ﬂicting interest between unifying measures at EU level and the right to national 
39) Dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria in ECtHR Grand 
Chamber S.H. and Others v. Austria appl. No. 57813/00, 2011.
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identity at national levels. In the EU, free movement of persons and the margin 
of appreciation doctrine adopted by the ECtHR, has led to a situation where any 
treatment that is legal in one Member State is available to all Europeans, regard-
less of the moral convictions of their state of aﬃliation. In the end, this may be a 
good situation for the cross-border patient, but less so for states with a clear moral 
position.
